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FOCUSED DISCUSSION
Scientific Instruments
Knowledge, Practice, and Culture [Editor’s Introduction]
Isaac Record∗
To one side of the wide third-floor hallway of Victoria College, just
outside the offices of the Institute for the History and Philosophy of
Science and Technology, lies the massive carcass of a 1960s-era
electron microscope. Its burnished steel carapace has lost its
gleam, but the instrument is still impressive for its bulk and spare
design: binocular viewing glasses, beam control panel, specimen
tray, and a broad work surface. Edges are worn, desiccated tape
still feebly holds instructive reminders near control dials; this was
once a workhorse in some lab. But it exists now out of time and
place; like many of the scientific instruments we study, it has not
been touched by knowing hands in decades.
The microscope in the hallway of the IHPST is a metaphor for the
place of instruments in science studies. They are of central interest, but
they do not really have their own place. Science studies, owing to roots
in the history of ideas, conceptual and textual analysis, and ethnography,
sometimes struggles to do justice to material things. It is no wonder we so
often speak of instruments as theories instantiated, as inscription devices,
or as actors in a network–that is, as extensions or modifications of things
we already know how to study. But instruments are not those things, and
treating them as such could distort our understanding of instruments and
their role in science.
WHAT ARE INSTRUMENTS?
There is no general agreement as to what counts as a “scientific
instrument.” The term came into wide use only in the nineteenth century
and, following Maxwell, indicated “a piece of apparatus constructed
specially for the performance of experiments” (quoted in Warner 1990, 88).
Seventeenth-century microscopes and air pumps were called “engines,”
not instruments, but as natural philosophers shifted their methods toward
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mathematical and geometrical demonstration–and away from ignoble
manual labour–makers of such devices began to call them “philosophical.”
The recent turn toward instruments in HPS relies on an implicit (sometimes
explicit) rejection of this distinction. As a result engineers and scientists
are now appearing on equal footing in at least some accounts of the
history of science (see Galison 1998 for one important example), and
Patrick Carroll-Burke advocates a return to explicitly acknowledging the
“engine”-aspect of instruments, treating them as “epistemic engines,” hard
at work variously transducing the world into number, framing phenomena
to the senses, generating inscriptions, or “vexing phenomena” within
“chambers,” spaces “within which phenomena can be materially secured
and manipulated” (Carroll-Burke 2001, 607).
In this issue of Spontaneous Generations, several of our contributors
wrestle with the notion of instrument, pushing it in sometimes unexpected
directions. INGRID HEHMEYER finds that sometimes an instrument isn’t
an instrument at all–it has been faked. She recounts the tale of one
such instrument, an astrolabe, and how it was acquired by Toronto’s
Royal Ontario Museum and eventually revealed as a forgery. Even when
provenance is sure, it is sometimes difficult to determine what should count
as an instrument. Maxwell’s notion–apparatus for experiment–reflects our
intuitions, at least for the physics lab bench. What about the social
sciences? Here, in addition to electromechanical devices, human beings
themselves become a part of the designed experiment. People playing
such roles are called confederates, since (some part of) their behavior
is designed by the experimentalist. MAARTEN DERKSEN considers the
fundamental tension in using people as instruments, a role that defines
them both as free autonomous subjects and as predictable natural objects.
When social scientists use people as instruments, “their instrumentality is
hidden [from subjects] in order to be effective” (p. 21).
Where social sciences rely on obfuscation, experimentation in the
physical sciences can risk equivocating between experimental systems
and their target systems outside of the laboratory walls. ROM HARRÉ
proposes to distinguish two kinds of equipment for experimentation:
“instruments,” which are related causally to phenomena of interest, and
“apparatus,” which are related conceptually to phenomena of interest. Both
would have counted as instruments for Maxwell, but Harré’s principled
distinction implies that each type should be understood differently.
WENDY PARKER asks what one kind of instrument, the digital computer,
is for. Many instruments enhance our natural perceptual abilities or help
us carry out interventions. Computers seem not, strictly speaking, to do
those things, except perhaps in the mundane sense of automating data
analysis and fine control of machinery. But we increasingly use computers
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for exploring models, developing explanations, forecasting, designing and
interpreting experiments, and by some accounts, even measuring (at any
rate, they sometimes “serve the same function as measuring devices, i.e.
they can reliably deliver information about real-world target systems that
we might otherwise seek using traditional measuring devices” [p. 42]). In
order to understand instruments, we must more fully understand each of
the roles we ask them to play.
INSTRUMENTS FOR MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL
Five of our contributors take up the topic of instruments used for
measurement and control. The first two deal with the development and
maintenance of standards. MICHAEL BARANY recounts an episode from
Charles Piazzi Smyth’s expedition to measure the pyramids in which
Piazzi Smyth abandons a theoretically vetted but practically unusable
measurement system in favor of an improvised system resting on the
material stability of a hunk of basalt. He concludes that instrumental
science is irreducibly local and bottom-up, despite appearances to the
contrary; moreover, “the rigors of the basalt Standard’s construction
undergirded its claims to validity, even as they undermined any possible
aspirations to precision or perfection” (p. 57).
JAMES HULL comes to a similar conclusion in his study of the “freeness
tester,” a control device designed by a Canadian government facility at
McGill University. In this case, however, the tester was adopted as an
international standard for industrial control by the pulp and paper industry,
which “allows a single laboratory in suburban Montreal to measure locally
and control globally” (p. 68). Of course, most precision instruments now
trace back to national standards laboratories rather than small university
facilities, but the point remains: although the construction of standards
is a fundamentally local process, it has global implications, including
the calibration routines experimentalists perform in order to know their
instruments are working properly.
One important question for scientists and philosophers of science is
how we can tell when instruments are working. Scientists’ claims and
philosophers’ judgements about the capabilities of instruments are only
valid for instruments that are working properly. In this issue, ALLAN
FRANKLIN asks the converse question: “How can one determine if an
experimental apparatus is giving an incorrect result, if it is speaking
falsely?” (p. 71). Elsewhere, Franklin has detailed an epistemology of
experiment, a set of strategies used by scientists to ensure apparatuses
are working. If an instrument fails to pass one of these tests, he argues, it
is unreliable. But what happens when some of these tests are unavailable?
In this article, Franklin discusses a case in which certain results remained
Spontaneous Generations 4:1(2010) 3
I. Record Editor’s Introduction
indecisive for fifteen years–until a new apparatus was available to eliminate
a plausible alternative explanation.
MARIO BUNGE further complicates any hope of a simplistic account of
the operation of instruments. “Most instruments ... do not show directly the
value of a property: what they show instead is the value of an indicator, that
is an observable counterpart to an unperceivable item” (p. 86). Indicators
bridge noumena and phenomena. DAVIS BAIRD, too, notes that indicators
are often quite distant from the variables we try to control, and in addition,
“the variables one chooses matter” (p. 108). Baird is concerned not only
with the security of epistemic claims but also the world we subtly choose
to inhabit. We live in a world increasingly manufactured and managed, and
this engineered reality goes far beyond simple consumer products. When
we set out to measure performance or alter undesired behaviours, we also
redefine what it means to be a normal, healthy, intelligent human being.
Have we made the right choices?
INSTRUMENTS AS EXTENSIONS
Much epistemology of science has focused on what we should (or
shouldn’t) believe about the output of scientific instruments. For example,
when, if ever, do instrument outputs give us knowledge about their targets?
Van Fraassen has long held that we should accept (but not believe in the
existence of) any “unobservable” entities on which we rely to make our
theories empirically adequate (1980). On the other hand, Hacking thinks
that when experimentalists use “unobservable” entities to investigate
further phenomena, the experimentalists are treating those entities as real,
and we should follow their lead (1983).
More recently, Humphreys has argued that the traditional distinction
between “observable” and “unobservable” is epistemically uninteresting,
relying on an arbitrary, anthropocentric distinction. Instruments extend
perceptual and cognitive capacities (2004). In this issue, PAUL
HUMPHREYS argues that we need to grow our epistemology to match.
“There are two options: expanding human frameworks and off-loading
some or most of the representational work to artificial cognizers” (p.
113). Two of our contributors make inroads in these directions. MATHIEU
CHARBONNEAU integrates the lessons of Clark and Chalmers’ extended
cognition with Davis Baird’s thing knowledge to produce a novel and
attractive account of instruments as materially-extended beliefs existing
outside of, but interestingly connected to, the minds of their users.
Charbonneau offers the example of an orrery, a device used to calculate
and depict the motions of planetary bodies around a central sun. “The
orrery [can play] the same functional role for [one] scientist that the
astronomical bodies’ relative position and trajectory formulas [would] for
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[another]” (p. 125). Indeed, we can consider the orrery to instantiate a
set of beliefs about planetary positions, and the proper use of the device
is functionally equivalent to remembering those beliefs and putting them
to use. PHILIP MCCULLOUGH also takes up the extended mind thesis,
arguing that it provides for a new understanding of machine thought, one
that survives the test of Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment.
On the other hand, HARRY COLLINS urges caution regarding accounts
that treat instruments as having parity with their human users. Implicating
both extended mind and actor network theory, Collins argues that such
accounts cannot overcome one key distinction between instruments
and humans: only humans are embedded in language communities.
Instruments have users, and it is these users who determine the meaning
of instrument results.
DIFFERENT USERS, DIFFERENT VIEWS
TREVOR LEVERE reviews the ways in which various
individuals–collectors and dealers, curators, historians, instrument
makers, philosophers, and scientists–come into contact with instruments,
and the array of expertise they bring to the conversation about instruments.
The nature of history and philosophy of science has been such that we
have not always attended to the interests of hobbyists, those instrument
users who are not professional scientists. JESSICA ELLEN SEWELL and
ANDREW JOHNSTON examine the Dobsonian telescope, an inexpensive
but powerful device built from off-the-shelf parts. Sewell and Johnston
bring to bear considerations of material culture, highlighting some of
the aspects of instrument use often overlooked by science studies, for
example, issues of access, the “gesture training” offered by the physical
form of the device, and science popularization.
FRANÇOIS THOREAU and MARIA NEICU apply Galison’s concept of
trading zones to a research group adopting a new shared microscope,
and the role this instrument played in the reconfiguring of their research
practices and ethics. They identify three repertoires for forming the trading
zone: scientific, the microscope was expected to provide better results;
economic, researchers felt pressure to use the machine before it outlived
the competitive advantage it conferred; and strategic, researchers viewed
a properly configured microscope as a “publication machine.”
ULJANA FEEST shows that instrument epistemology can be helpful
in understanding other aspects of scientific practice. She asks “how do
we make sense of concept use in cases where scientists investigate
phenomena or objects they don’t know much about, or perhaps aren’t even
sure that they really exist?” (p. 173). Feest argues that if we take concepts
to be research tools, we can understand them as applying provisionally
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or partially, and shift our attention from what concepts mean generally to
what scientists take them to mean in particular cases.
In addition to the Focused Discussion section described above, which
comprises a mix of invited and refereed short articles, this issue contains
two full-length refereed articles. Both speak to the topic of scientific
instruments, and I want to take special notice of them here. In the first
article, MATTHEW SHINDELL examines the roles played by instruments
such as the orbiting infrared spectrometer in the development of the
field of planetary geology. Shindell finds that “a great deal of disciplinary
work was necessary before field geologists could properly lay claim to
planetary surfaces other than Earth’s and before the instruments onboard
the rovers could be considered geological tools” (p. 193). Instruments
alone do not enable the study of phenomena. They need to be embedded
within practices and user communities, who themselves understand
these instruments within an existing (though adaptive) disciplinary frame.
Moreover, “the instrument is not a simple extension of the senses of the
scientist, but one part of a social project of perception” (p. 194). In the
second article, DOROTHY SUTHERLAND OLSEN conceptualizes tools as
“bearers of encapsulated knowledge and as being in a state where they
can be both used and developed at the same time” (p. 250). This enables
her to make sense of three different ways in which experimenters can gain
knowledge: using tools according to established convention, using tools
“wrongly,” and the purposeful redesign of tools.
And what about that electron microscope in the hall? It is presently
joined by dozens of other curated objects displayed and described with
care and passion by an enterprising group of graduate students from
IHPST. ERICH WEIDENHAMMER and MICHAEL DA SILVA describe the
University of Toronto Scientific Instrument Collection project in our Opinion
section. Aided by modest material (and wholehearted moral) institutional
support, the UTSIC is the latest in a series of efforts to build a meaningful
instrument collection at the University of Toronto.
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